On Gettier holdouts

Frank Jackson

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01427.x

On Gettier holdouts

Frank Jackson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are not as far apart as is often thought.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	468-481
Number of pages	14
Journal	Mind and Language
Volume	26
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01427.x
Publication status	Published - Sept 2011

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On Gettier holdouts

Abstract

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