On the frequency of interior cournot-nash equilibria in a public good economy

Wolfgang Buchholz; Richard Cornes; Wolfgang Peters

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x

On the frequency of interior cournot-nash equilibria in a public good economy

Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes, Wolfgang Peters

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	401-408
Number of pages	8
Journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	8
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x
Publication status	Published - 2006
Externally published	Yes

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10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x

Cite this

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On the frequency of interior cournot-nash equilibria in a public good economy

Abstract

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