On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality

Jc Beall; Ross Brady; J. Michael Dunn; A. P. Hazen; Edwin Mares; Robert K. Meyer; Graham Priest; Greg Restall; David Ripley; John Slaney; Richard Sylvan

doi:10.1007/s10992-011-9191-5

On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality

Jc Beall^*, Ross Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney, Richard Sylvan

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

63 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	595-612
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Philosophical Logic
Volume	41
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9191-5
Publication status	Published - Jun 2012

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title = "On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality",

abstract = "One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.",

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AU - Beall, Jc

AU - Brady, Ross

AU - Dunn, J. Michael

AU - Hazen, A. P.

AU - Mares, Edwin

AU - Meyer, Robert K.

AU - Priest, Graham

AU - Restall, Greg

AU - Ripley, David

AU - Slaney, John

AU - Sylvan, Richard

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AB - One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.

KW - Conditionality

KW - Conditionals

KW - Modal logics

KW - Paraconsistent logics

KW - Possible worlds

KW - Relative relative possibility

KW - Relevant logics

KW - Routley-Meyer semantics

KW - Situations

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KW - Ternary-relation semantics

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JO - Journal of Philosophical Logic

JF - Journal of Philosophical Logic

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On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality

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