Opportunity lost: Partisan incentives and the 1997 constitutional revisions in Taiwan

Two factors account for Taiwan's failure to consolidate democratic rule through constitutional revision even after the island's remarkably successful decade of democratization. First, though the two leading parties shared a common interest in working out a smooth pattern of liberalization and democratization, vital reforms of the constitutional and electoral systems were either not in the strategic interests of the major parties, or not of crucial importance to the parties, especially to President Lee and the Kuomintang Party, who were in the stronger position as the ruling party. Second, the parties were constrained by the existing Constitution and their own policy platforms, both of which were profoundly shaped by Taiwan's conflict with mainland China. The KMT was forced to work within a constitutional structure derived from its period on the mainland, while the DPP's stance on revisions was constrained by the priority it placed on increasing Taiwan's sense of independence.