Political Groups, Coordination Costs, and Credible Communication in the Shadow of Power

Across subfields of political science, groups in subordinate power positions often have incentives to feign satisfaction with the status quo, in order to avoid punishment from more powerful actors. Consequently, subordinate actors’ cooperative public discourse is widely considered non-credible “cheap talk.” In contrast, we argue that for dissatisfied groups, misrepresenting preferences through cooperative public discourse involves significant costs and risks. To minimize the risk that proscribed goals will be discovered, subordinate actors must restrict even private discourse. Yet political groups and organizations rely on internal communication to achieve the intragroup coordination necessary to develop and implement policies. Refraining from proscribed discourse therefore constitutes a costly signal that carries some degree of credibility. Our argument has broad implications both for signaling theories and for the empirical measurement of actors’ preferences, which generalize across subfields of political science. These implications are illustrated by empirical applications to U.S. foreign policymaking, China’s international relations, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions.