TY - JOUR
T1 - Privatisation of building code enforcement
T2 - a comparative study of regimes in Australia and Canada
AU - Van Der Heijden, Jeroen
PY - 2010/4/20
Y1 - 2010/4/20
N2 - Purpose – The paper aims to document the effects of the privatisation of building code enforcement regimes. It notes that privatisation is generally accompanied by tradeoffs between competing democratic values such as effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and equity and explores the extent to which particular tradeoffs might be related to aspects of the design of the regimes in which they occur. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a comparative case study analysis of two Australian and two Canadian privatised building control regimes. This comparison is based on semistructured interviews with key actors in the building and building control industries. Findings – Evidence of the expected tradeoffs between competing democratic values is found in the privatised regimes within the case study. Some of these might be explained in terms of the extent of private sector involvement (PSI) in a regime, or of the nature of the relationship between the public and the private sectors within it. However, not all tradeoffs are necessarily related to these characteristics. Overall, PSI deliver an increase in effectiveness and efficiency but at a particular cost of public accountability. A competitive, rather than a complementary, relationship between the private and public sectors in a privatised regime is also found to be more likely to generate problems related to the equity of the service being provided. Research limitations/implications – The case studies are explorative in nature and the research does not therefore claim empirical generalization, but instead provides illustrations of the impacts that might result from privatising building code enforcement. The paper is largely based on a series of interviews. The findings should be understood as the aggregated opinions of the interviewees. Practical implications – Based on the case study analysis, the paper draws important conclusions for policymakers in this area. It suggests that privatisation should be performed with the utmost care and highlights positive features of the regimes studied that might indicate some of the ingredients of a successful privatisation. These include providing private sector inspectors with the opportunity to specialize, confining PSI to assessment tasks, and ensuring that a complementary relationship exists between the private and public sectors within the privatised regime. Originality/value – The paper makes original contributes to existing literature on the impact of the “policy mix” on regulatory governance, and on the tradeoffs which result from the introduction of the private sector into regulatory governance.
AB - Purpose – The paper aims to document the effects of the privatisation of building code enforcement regimes. It notes that privatisation is generally accompanied by tradeoffs between competing democratic values such as effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and equity and explores the extent to which particular tradeoffs might be related to aspects of the design of the regimes in which they occur. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a comparative case study analysis of two Australian and two Canadian privatised building control regimes. This comparison is based on semistructured interviews with key actors in the building and building control industries. Findings – Evidence of the expected tradeoffs between competing democratic values is found in the privatised regimes within the case study. Some of these might be explained in terms of the extent of private sector involvement (PSI) in a regime, or of the nature of the relationship between the public and the private sectors within it. However, not all tradeoffs are necessarily related to these characteristics. Overall, PSI deliver an increase in effectiveness and efficiency but at a particular cost of public accountability. A competitive, rather than a complementary, relationship between the private and public sectors in a privatised regime is also found to be more likely to generate problems related to the equity of the service being provided. Research limitations/implications – The case studies are explorative in nature and the research does not therefore claim empirical generalization, but instead provides illustrations of the impacts that might result from privatising building code enforcement. The paper is largely based on a series of interviews. The findings should be understood as the aggregated opinions of the interviewees. Practical implications – Based on the case study analysis, the paper draws important conclusions for policymakers in this area. It suggests that privatisation should be performed with the utmost care and highlights positive features of the regimes studied that might indicate some of the ingredients of a successful privatisation. These include providing private sector inspectors with the opportunity to specialize, confining PSI to assessment tasks, and ensuring that a complementary relationship exists between the private and public sectors within the privatised regime. Originality/value – The paper makes original contributes to existing literature on the impact of the “policy mix” on regulatory governance, and on the tradeoffs which result from the introduction of the private sector into regulatory governance.
KW - Australia
KW - Buildings
KW - Canada
KW - Privatization
KW - Regulation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84986091960&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1108/17561451011036522
DO - 10.1108/17561451011036522
M3 - Article
SN - 1756-1450
VL - 2
SP - 60
EP - 75
JO - International Journal of Law in the Built Environment
JF - International Journal of Law in the Built Environment
IS - 1
ER -