Abstract
The essay is in three sections. The first section introduces three plausible assumptions about the role of properties in causal explanations. We will not be questioning these assumptions here. The second section shows how these assumptions generate a problem when combined with a fourth assumption that looks equally difficult to resist. The third section offers a solution to the problem by showing how, nevertheless, we can and should resist this fourth assumption. The fourth assumption is that the only way in which a property can be causally relevant to an effect is by being causally efficacious in its production. In order to resist that assumption, the essay draws on an account of causal relevance under which a property can be causally relevant without being causally efficacious.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Mind, Morality, and Explanation |
| Subtitle of host publication | Selected Collaborations |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 119-130 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781383039337 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199253364 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2024 |