Abstract
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) embodies Beijing's global ambitions. Social opposition to BRI projects in host countries, however, undermines China's preferred image. Beijing, therefore, requires state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to enhance public engagement to secure local people's support. Embedded in Myanmar's political transition in the 2010s, this study interrogates variations in Chinese SOEs’ public engagement approaches to three leading BRI projects, namely the Myitsone dam, the Letpadaung copper mine and the China–Myanmar dual pipeline. Some studies attribute discrepancies in engagement approaches to fragmented and decentralised implementation of the BRI. Nonetheless, it remains puzzling that an SOE constantly adjusted its public engagement strategies in the same project over time. Building on the institutional theory, this article argues that an SOE's behaviour was jointly shaped by endogenous cognitive beliefs and exogenous constraints imposed by Myanmar society and Beijing. Intra-case analysis and cross-case comparisons in this study find that an SOE would pursue dialogue with societal actors when strong local resistance coincided with close Beijing's scrutiny over a project. Otherwise, an SOE would manage its relations with locals in a hierarchical accountability, blame-shifting or even business-as-usual approach. That said, an SOE's public engagement was not institutionalised but reactive to its dynamic external environments.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-26 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 25 Jun 2025 |