Ramsey without ethical neutrality: A new representation theorem

Frank Ramsey s Truth and Probability sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a (somewhat incomplete) representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey s formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout Ramseys system. A number of later representation theorems have also appealed to ethically neutral propositions. The notion of ethical neutrality has often been called into question-in fact, there seem to be good reasons to suppose that no ethically neutral propositions exist. In this paper, I present several new, Ramsey-inspired representation theorems that avoid any appeal to ethical neutrality. These theorems preserve the benefits of Ramseys system, without paying the cost of ethical neutrality.