Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion

Michael Smith*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    124 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay 'Skepticism about Weakness of Will', the idea of an unexercised capacity is much more difficult to make sense of than it initially appears. The aim of 'Rational Capacities' is to provide the needed explication of this idea.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationWeakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Electronic)9780191601842
    ISBN (Print)0199257361, 9780199257362
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 4 Sept 2003

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