RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND VOTING

Keith Dowding*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Political economy, in studies of voter and party behavior, usually refers to a specific method: the economic or rational choice method. What people find - and this is not unimportant in applications to voting and party behavior - is that for collectives sometimes they cannot make a prediction, at least for single events, for it turns out there are no pure equilibrium strategies and/or there are multiple equilibriums. A bigger problem for the spatial models is valence issues. Trust can mean several things in this context. It could be an issue of competence or it could be related to how the voter thinks the candidate will respond to unforeseen contingencies. Uncertainty over spatial location shows the need for campaigning to provide information and provide such signals. “Utility” in this formulation is a completely empty concept. The rational turnout problem has long been associated with rational choice models.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion
    PublisherTaylor and Francis
    Pages30-40
    Number of pages11
    ISBN (Electronic)9781317494812
    ISBN (Print)9781138890404
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017

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