Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents

Lara Buchak*, Philip Pettit

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    John Broome has argued that there are distinct requirements of rationality and reason. Niko Kolodny has defended an error theory about requirements of rationality, arguing that requirements of rationality fall out of the requirements of reason, not in the straightforward sense that one has a reason to be rational as such, but in the sense that requirements of rationality are a byproduct of requirements of reason. Recent work in the theory of group agency and the problem of judgment aggregation raises a difficulty for applying Kolodny's error theory to the case of requirements of group rationality and group reason. This chapter explores ways in which the conflict between the proposed error theory in the group case and the results concerning judgment aggregation might be resolved. The chapter also considers what bearing the group case has on the success of the error theory in the individual case.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationWeighing and Reasoning
    Subtitle of host publicationThemes from the Philosophy of John Broome
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Electronic)9780191765223
    ISBN (Print)9780199684908
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 21 May 2015

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