Abstract
In this text, we point out some obvious commitments of the identity theory of mind which allow the identity theorist to sidestep Saul Kripke’s famous anti-materialist argument. We also argue that a recent paper by Joseph Almog fails to undermine Kripke’s internalism about sensations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 815-818 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2024 |
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