Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk

Sherrill Shaffer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041

Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk

Sherrill Shaffer^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by enhancing deposit insurance coverage, may reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. A newly available dataset provides empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	383-385
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	117
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041
Publication status	Published - Nov 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041

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title = "Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk",

abstract = "Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by enhancing deposit insurance coverage, may reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. A newly available dataset provides empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.",

keywords = "Bank risk, Moral hazard, Reciprocal brokered deposits",

author = "Sherrill Shaffer",

year = "2012",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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KW - Moral hazard

KW - Reciprocal brokered deposits

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041

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SP - 383

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk

Abstract

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