Regulation and revenue

Geoffrey Brennan; Hartmut Kliemt

doi:10.1007/s10602-008-9054-4

Regulation and revenue

Geoffrey Brennan
, Hartmut Kliemt^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The power to tax and the power to regulate are often analyzed separately. We argue that, when in the hands of a single authority, the power to tax may act as a check on the power to regulate, thereby discouraging regulations that adversely affect GDP, and promoting regulations that enhance GDP. This effect will be stronger the higher are (marginal) taxes. This argument is used both to suggest an explanation for the observed positive correlation between high taxes and economic freedom, and to warn against the granting of regulatory but not fiscal powers at the European level.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	249-260
Number of pages	12
Journal	Constitutional Political Economy
Volume	19
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9054-4
Publication status	Published - Sept 2008

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Regulation and revenue

Abstract

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