Abstract
Does the real difference between consequential and non-consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and neutrality.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 518-536 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 217 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2004 |