Relativity of value and the consequentialist umbrella

Jennie Louise*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    66 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Does the real difference between consequential and non-consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and neutrality.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)518-536
    Number of pages19
    JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
    Volume54
    Issue number217
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

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