TY - JOUR
T1 - Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation
AU - Mendelovici, Angela
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
AB - It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
KW - Asymmetric dependence
KW - Causal theories of mental representation
KW - Colors
KW - Mental representation
KW - Reliable misrepresentation
KW - Teleological theories of mental representation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881597672&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-012-9966-8
DO - 10.1007/s11098-012-9966-8
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 165
SP - 421
EP - 443
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 2
ER -