Rent capture in a rights-based fishery

R. Quentin Grafton*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

69 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function. Some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge, and an ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in simulations in terms of the distribution of profits, distortions to the fishery, the relative burden on fishers, and flexibility to adjust to changes in the fishery.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-67
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1995

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