Abstract
It has generally been understood that the instability of corporatist arrangements arises from the difficulty that participating interest groups have in legitimating policies to a membership which is distant from the policy-making process. This instability often manifests itself through inopportune mobilization of group members. The 'action framing' and the 'incentives' interest groups offer to their constituency are often an important mechanism in managing the mode and level of mobilization. However, the extent to which managing mobilization becomes necessary is contingent on the heterogeneity of interests the group represents. The paper explores the corporatist relationships between farmer interest groups and the state in Australia in this context. The interest group representing farmers in NSW, Australia, the NSWFA has, broadly speaking, moved away from a public militant, to a private 'bargained consensus,' model of policy development. This has created instability which, it is argued, the NSWFA has attempted to reduce by pursuing a strategy to attain guarantees of survival external to membership. The combination of action frames and incentive management which currently prevail have facilitated this transfer by replacing a 'willingness to act' with a 'willingness to pay' amongst its membership. The implications this transition has on the organizational stability of the NSWFA and the broader political representation of farmers is explored.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 78-99 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Sociologia Ruralis |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 1999 |
Externally published | Yes |