Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities

José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.013

Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities

José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j's utility when matched with i.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	545-550
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	135
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.013
Publication status	Published - Jul 2007

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Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities

Abstract

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