Responsiveness and robustness in the david lewis signaling game

Carl Brusse*, Justin Bruner

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)


    We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles.We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict-of-interest signaling games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1068-1079
    Number of pages12
    JournalPhilosophy of Science
    Issue number5
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2017


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