Abstract
This chapter argues that complaints against suffering harm should be discounted by the chance that someonerather than the chances that particular individualswould suffer harm. The case, after such discounting, for preventing the greater harm is not undermined by the mere fact of ignorance of the identity of who would suffer harm. Even when ignorance of a victims identity is explained by the presence of objective and indeterministic risks of harm, the presence of such risks hardly undermines the case for preventing the greater harm. It fails to undermine this case even when the victims identity is, in principle, unknowable, because there is no fact of the matter who he would be, given the openness of counterfactuals. When, moreover, neither the number nor the identity (or identities) of wouldbe victim(s) is known, that fact does not undermine the case for preventing the greatest expected harm rather than exhibiting a preference for identified victims.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Identified versus Statistical Lives |
Editors | I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 77-93 |
Volume | 1 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Print) | 9780190217471 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |