TY - JOUR
T1 - Robodebt and the limits of learning: exploring meaning-making after a crisis
AU - Maley, Maria
AU - Casey, Daniel
N1 - © 2025 The Author(s).
PY - 2025/6/6
Y1 - 2025/6/6
N2 - The flawed Robodebt programme, and its subsequent exposure through a Royal Commission, represented a serious crisis in Australian public administration. A vital task for leaders after a crisis is communication and meaning-making, which is a precondition for learning. Using Freedom of Information material from over 100 agencies, this study investigates whether and how Australian public service leaders communicated with their staff about the meaning of Robodebt and the lessons to be learnt, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. It finds more than a quarter of public servants did not receive communication from their bureaucratic leaders interpreting the crisis, in the first six months after the Royal Commission reported. When they did, some messages were dismissive, rejecting the idea that there were cultural problems in their agency, and ignoring the fundamental cause of the crisis: over-responsiveness to ministers. Other leaders, however, responded with genuine introspection and engaged with sensitive cultural issues. Organisations often fail to learn after a crisis, particularly where cultural learning is required, or where lessons must ‘travel’ across agencies. Given the limited meaning-making undertaken by many public service leaders, the article questions whether effective post-crisis learning is likely to occur.
AB - The flawed Robodebt programme, and its subsequent exposure through a Royal Commission, represented a serious crisis in Australian public administration. A vital task for leaders after a crisis is communication and meaning-making, which is a precondition for learning. Using Freedom of Information material from over 100 agencies, this study investigates whether and how Australian public service leaders communicated with their staff about the meaning of Robodebt and the lessons to be learnt, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. It finds more than a quarter of public servants did not receive communication from their bureaucratic leaders interpreting the crisis, in the first six months after the Royal Commission reported. When they did, some messages were dismissive, rejecting the idea that there were cultural problems in their agency, and ignoring the fundamental cause of the crisis: over-responsiveness to ministers. Other leaders, however, responded with genuine introspection and engaged with sensitive cultural issues. Organisations often fail to learn after a crisis, particularly where cultural learning is required, or where lessons must ‘travel’ across agencies. Given the limited meaning-making undertaken by many public service leaders, the article questions whether effective post-crisis learning is likely to occur.
KW - Post-crisis communication
KW - Robodebt
KW - over-responsiveness
KW - policy inaction
KW - policy learning
KW - Policy inaction
KW - Policy learning
KW - Over-responsiveness
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105007557417
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2025.2513651
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2025.2513651
M3 - Article
SN - 1350-1763
VL - 33
SP - 1
EP - 27
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
IS - 1
ER -