Abstract
David Hull famously argued that the very idea of human nature was pre-Darwinian; once we genuinely embrace Darwin’s insights into unbounded variation and plasticity over time, no robust account of human nature can survive. There have been a variety of responses to Hull’s critique, variously showing that some concept of human nature can be rebuilt in ways consistent with contemporary evolutionary biology. In this chapter, I argue that, in one sense, some of these reconstructive attempts succeed. One can develop a concept of human nature consistent with evolutionary insights into variation and potentially unbounded change. But in a deeper sense these reconstructive projects are in trouble: the cost of making a concept of human nature evolutionarily credible is, arguably, to rob that concept of explanatory salience.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Why We Disagree About Human Nature |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 108-126 |
Number of pages | 19 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198823650 |
Publication status | Published - 19 Jul 2018 |