Simple complexity from imitation games

Andrew McLennan; Rabee Tourky

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.003

Simple complexity from imitation games

Andrew McLennan^*, Rabee Tourky

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	683-688
Number of pages	6
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	68
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.003
Publication status	Published - Mar 2010
Externally published	Yes

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title = "Simple complexity from imitation games",

abstract = "We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.",

keywords = "Complexity, Imitation games, NASH, Quadratic programming, Stationary points, Symmetric Nash equilibria, Symmetric games",

author = "Andrew McLennan and Rabee Tourky",

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AB - We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.

KW - Complexity

KW - Imitation games

KW - NASH

KW - Quadratic programming

KW - Stationary points

KW - Symmetric Nash equilibria

KW - Symmetric games

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

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Simple complexity from imitation games

Abstract

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