Sketical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy

Yujin Nagasawa, Nick Trakakis

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is signi cantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need not lead to any such objectionable form of moral skepticism.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)online
    JournalArs Disputandi
    Volume4
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

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