TY - GEN
T1 - Social Shaping of Competitive Equilibriums for Resilient Multi-Agent Systems
AU - Chen, Yijun
AU - Islam, Razibul
AU - Ratnam, Elizabeth
AU - Petersen, Ian R.
AU - Shi, Guodong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In this paper, we study entirely self-sustained multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocation. Agents make local resource decisions, and sometimes, trading decisions to maximize their individual payoffs accruing from the utility of consumption and the income or expenditure from trading. A competitive equilibrium is achieved if all agents maximize their individual payoffs; a social welfare equilibrium is achieved if the total agent utilities are maximized. First, we consider multi-agent systems with static local allocation, and prove from duality theory that under general convexity assumptions, the competitive equilibrium and the social welfare equilibrium exist and agree. Next, we define a social shaping problem for a competitive equilibrium under which the optimal resource price is socially acceptable, and show that agent utility functions can be prescribed in a family of socially admissible quadratic functions, under which the pricing at the competitive equilibrium is always below a threshold. Finally, we extend the study to dynamical multi-agent systems where agents are associated with dynamical states from linear processes, and prove that the dynamic competitive equilibrium and social welfare equilibrium continue to exist and coincide with each other.
AB - In this paper, we study entirely self-sustained multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocation. Agents make local resource decisions, and sometimes, trading decisions to maximize their individual payoffs accruing from the utility of consumption and the income or expenditure from trading. A competitive equilibrium is achieved if all agents maximize their individual payoffs; a social welfare equilibrium is achieved if the total agent utilities are maximized. First, we consider multi-agent systems with static local allocation, and prove from duality theory that under general convexity assumptions, the competitive equilibrium and the social welfare equilibrium exist and agree. Next, we define a social shaping problem for a competitive equilibrium under which the optimal resource price is socially acceptable, and show that agent utility functions can be prescribed in a family of socially admissible quadratic functions, under which the pricing at the competitive equilibrium is always below a threshold. Finally, we extend the study to dynamical multi-agent systems where agents are associated with dynamical states from linear processes, and prove that the dynamic competitive equilibrium and social welfare equilibrium continue to exist and coincide with each other.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85116735893&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683243
DO - 10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683243
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 2621
EP - 2626
BT - 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2021
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2021
Y2 - 13 December 2021 through 17 December 2021
ER -