Special majorities rationalized

Robert E. Goodin*, Christian List

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    22 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolving matters left open by symmetrical special-majority rules - such as 'judicial extrapolation' or 'subsidiarity' in a federal system.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)213-241
    Number of pages29
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    Volume36
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2006

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