Strictly speaking

Renee Bolinger, Alexander Sandgren

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)3-11
    JournalAnalysis
    Volume80
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2020

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