Taxation and Settler Colonialism: The Palestinian Case

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Abstract

In the context of settler colonialism, taxation and public revenue systems are integral to the political narratives surrounding indigenous nations and peoples. The fiscal arrangements established within these settings often manifest as asymmetrical budgetary structures and tax collection mechanisms. This paper critically examines the typology of public revenues in Palestine to elucidate the complexities of taxation and fiscal management under a settler colonial framework. Employing the theoretical lenses of critical fiscal sociology this analysis provides a nuanced understanding of the dynamics governing taxation, public revenue generation, and service provision in the occupied Palestinian territories. The study contends that external dependencies, Israeli tax control measures, and a fragmented network of service providers collectively undermine efforts to forge a socio-fiscal contract. This situation is exacerbated by declining international aid, necessitating a heightened reliance on domestic tax mobilization. The paper argues that these challenges reflect broader issues inherent in public revenue mobilization within a settler colonial setting. Furthermore, Israel’s settler colonial project is facilitated by the enforced taxation policies in the oPt, which not only impede development and economic liberation but also serve as sophisticated instruments for domination that advance the hegemon’s political objectives. Ultimately, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of fiscal operations within Israeli settler colonial structures and offers critical insights into the politics of taxation and revenue mobilization.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages17
JournalForum for Development Studies
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 23 May 2025

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