Abstract
We do good by bringing about welcome consequences, particularly disposition-dependent ones. Thus we give respect by acting out of the beneficent disposition not to interfere in one another’s personal choices. But while we do evil by bringing about unwelcome consequences, these are rarely disposition-dependent: they do not require that we act out of a maleficent disposition or that we conform to standards of malice in our behavior. This observation helps to explain the Knobe effect whereby we ascribe intentionality more readily to presumptively bad actions than to good. Thus to help the environment requires acting out of a helpful disposition, ensuring that you conform to beneficent standards. To harm the environment requires only that you create an environmental cost, breaching those standards: it does not require that you act out of the disposition of an environmental vandal, ensuring that you conform to a vandal’s standards.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics |
Editors | Mark Timmons |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 15-37 |
Volume | 5 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199693221 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |