The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis, 1938-39

In the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the Second World War a commonly held view amongst the British public was that in any future conflict the support of the Dominions would be unconditional and immediately forthcoming. The Statute of Westminster had officially recognised the agreement reached five years before in which Britain identified the Dominions as autonomous communities within the British Empire. According to Lord Balfour's 1926 declaration, although they were united by a common allegiance to the Crown, each was freely associated with, and treated as equal in status to, each of the others in all matters domestic and external. With little defence spending they still, however, looked to Britain for their security hence the popular belief that a British war would also be the Dominions' war. Whilst this assessment was in fact broadly correct - there was never any doubt for example that New Zealand would not support Britain - considerable evidence was available during the years prior to the outbreak of war to show that the government in Pretoria was extremely reluctant to allow itself to be drawn into another European quarrel. Although the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 had been seen at the time as a great Imperial success, its relationship with Britain during the inter-war years was characterised by underlying tensions. Nonetheless as the European political situation deteriorated there were still few in Whitehall who would believe that South African support could not be counted upon. In the end it would actually take an emergency parliamentary debate in September 1939, one that led to the resignation of the country's Prime Minister, and allegations of serious malpractice by the British appointed governor-general before an agreement to join the reformed Imperial alliance could be offered. Such was the bitterness surrounding this debate that there even emerged the possibility the Union could descend into civil war. And with the exception of only a few key British officials, there was nothing the government in London could do to influence the outcome.