Abstract
I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of "cause" to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory en tails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causa.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 11-31 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Theoria: Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2000 |