Abstract
I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 170-184 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2004 |