TY - JOUR
T1 - The contingency of contingency
AU - Leuenberger, Stephan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
PY - 2015/2
Y1 - 2015/2
N2 - In this paper, I have argued that if we are modal liberals, then we should not be modal rationalists. Further, I provided two arguments for the conclusion that if we are modal liberals but not modal rationalists, then we should acknowledge our own position to be at most contingently true. The resulting view, general contingentism, has it that the world is full of contingency, but only contingently so. Still, the question remains whether we should be modal liberals. In section i, I provided some motivation for it. In the last section, I defended the view against a number of objections. Pending a more thorough evaluation, it seems to me that the view is perfectly coherent. If I am right, it is true that there could be brute necessities, but that, by itself, does not give us any reason to think that there are any. Admittedly, general contingentism faces a number of challenges. What kind of logical systems for the two operators h and L are compatible with it? How are we to account for the validity of certain inferences using the word actually given that the standard theory appears problematic for modal liberalism? Such questions call for more technical work, and cannot be addressed within the confines of this paper. A definitive evaluation of the view will depend on how they can be answered. Here, my aim has merely been to argue that among theories about what is possible, general contingentism is a serious contender.
AB - In this paper, I have argued that if we are modal liberals, then we should not be modal rationalists. Further, I provided two arguments for the conclusion that if we are modal liberals but not modal rationalists, then we should acknowledge our own position to be at most contingently true. The resulting view, general contingentism, has it that the world is full of contingency, but only contingently so. Still, the question remains whether we should be modal liberals. In section i, I provided some motivation for it. In the last section, I defended the view against a number of objections. Pending a more thorough evaluation, it seems to me that the view is perfectly coherent. If I am right, it is true that there could be brute necessities, but that, by itself, does not give us any reason to think that there are any. Admittedly, general contingentism faces a number of challenges. What kind of logical systems for the two operators h and L are compatible with it? How are we to account for the validity of certain inferences using the word actually given that the standard theory appears problematic for modal liberalism? Such questions call for more technical work, and cannot be addressed within the confines of this paper. A definitive evaluation of the view will depend on how they can be answered. Here, my aim has merely been to argue that among theories about what is possible, general contingentism is a serious contender.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84976543947&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5840/jphil201511226
DO - 10.5840/jphil201511226
M3 - Article
SN - 0022-362X
VL - 112
SP - 84
EP - 112
JO - Journal of Philosophy
JF - Journal of Philosophy
IS - 2
ER -