The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

Daniel Nolan

doi:10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806

The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

Daniel Nolan^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Abstract: Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	623-644
Number of pages	22
Journal	Inquiry (United Kingdom)
Volume	57
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806
Publication status	Published - 15 Nov 2014

Access to Document

10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806

Cite this

@article{bcd58acdad98479e9fd07c450d7aeb61,

title = "The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue",

abstract = "Abstract: Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.",

author = "Daniel Nolan",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 Taylor & Francis.",

year = "2014",

month = nov,

day = "15",

doi = "10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806",

language = "English",

volume = "57",

pages = "623--644",

journal = "Inquiry (United Kingdom)",

issn = "0020-174X",

publisher = "Routledge",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

AU - Nolan, Daniel

PY - 2014/11/15

Y1 - 2014/11/15

N2 - Abstract: Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.

AB - Abstract: Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84911958159&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806

DO - 10.1080/0020174X.2014.967806

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-174X

VL - 57

SP - 623

EP - 644

JO - Inquiry (United Kingdom)

JF - Inquiry (United Kingdom)

ER -

The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

Abstract

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this