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The Decline of Too Big to Fail

Antje Berndt, Darrell Duffie, Yichao Zhu*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of “too big to fail.”

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)945-974
Number of pages30
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume115
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2025

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