The Economics of Allocation in Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

This chapter reviews existing allocation mechanisms in the five tuna regional fisheries management organizations and shows that although they have adopted different approaches, all have failed to prevent overcapacity and, for some stocks, overexploitation. As an alternative, it is proposed that each tuna regional fishing management organization establish total allowable catches by species and area, and then allocate nontransferable and permanent country shares (as a proportion of the total harvest) to member countries. Each country would be free to use or sell its annual allocation of fish, which would be determined by the permanent country shares, but the sales could be only to fellow member countries. A two-tier allocation to countries of permanent shares of a total allowable catch, and then annual harvest allocations to vessels of member countries, offers the promise of mitigating, and possibly overcoming, the twin problems of overcapacity and overexploitation in the highly migratory and high-seas tuna fisheries.