Abstract
Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether the success of this solicitation ordering in part can be attributed to the fact that it enables individuals to select organizations that have a high-status donor base. Assuming that individuals prefer to associate with individuals of higher social ranking we use a simple linear model to show that both aggregate donations and earnings are larger when high-status donors are solicited first. We investigate the predicted comparative statics using the experimental laboratory. Inducing a status differential we reverse the contribution ordering between participants of high and low status. Consistent with current fundraising practice, we find that low-status followers are likely to mimic donations by high-status leaders and this encourages high-status leaders to give. Donations are therefore larger when individuals of high status give before rather than after those of low status.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 709-735 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |