TY - JOUR
T1 - The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching in Canada
T2 - 1945-2011
AU - Snagovsky, Feodor
AU - Kerby, Matthew
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2018.
PY - 2018/6/1
Y1 - 2018/6/1
N2 - This article addresses the overlooked subject of party switching in the Canadian House of Commons for the period 1945-2011. We estimate a model that explores how and why MPs engage in the otherwise risky behaviour of abandoning their party labels in a system characterized by a low personal vote. Our findings suggest that the electoral consequences for MPs who switch parties for policy reasons are indistinguishable from MPs who do not switch at all. By contrast, MPs who switch parties for office-related reasons, such as to accept a seat in cabinet or vote-related reasons, experience large electoral penalties. We also find that MPs who are expelled from caucus face the strongest electoral penalties of all party switchers, indicating it matters whether an MP jumps or is pushed. Our findings suggest that voters recognize opportunistic behaviour among their legislators and punish them accordingly and that under some circumstances, party switching may be both strategic and rational.
AB - This article addresses the overlooked subject of party switching in the Canadian House of Commons for the period 1945-2011. We estimate a model that explores how and why MPs engage in the otherwise risky behaviour of abandoning their party labels in a system characterized by a low personal vote. Our findings suggest that the electoral consequences for MPs who switch parties for policy reasons are indistinguishable from MPs who do not switch at all. By contrast, MPs who switch parties for office-related reasons, such as to accept a seat in cabinet or vote-related reasons, experience large electoral penalties. We also find that MPs who are expelled from caucus face the strongest electoral penalties of all party switchers, indicating it matters whether an MP jumps or is pushed. Our findings suggest that voters recognize opportunistic behaviour among their legislators and punish them accordingly and that under some circumstances, party switching may be both strategic and rational.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041519212&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0008423917001445
DO - 10.1017/S0008423917001445
M3 - Review article
SN - 0008-4239
VL - 51
SP - 425
EP - 445
JO - Canadian Journal of Political Science
JF - Canadian Journal of Political Science
IS - 2
ER -