The epistemic approach to the problem of consciousness

Daniel Stoljar

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.22

The epistemic approach to the problem of consciousness

Daniel Stoljar^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	482-496
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Electronic)	9780198749677
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.22
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2020

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The epistemic approach to the problem of consciousness

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