The evolution of awareness

Simon Grant; John Quiggin

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010

The evolution of awareness

Simon Grant, John Quiggin^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	86-92
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume	63
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010
Publication status	Published - Dec 2017

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title = "The evolution of awareness",

abstract = "We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.",

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author = "Simon Grant and John Quiggin",

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AB - We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.

KW - Bounded rationality

KW - Evolutionarily stable equilibrium

KW - Unawareness

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DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010

M3 - Article

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VL - 63

SP - 86

EP - 92

JO - Journal of Economic Psychology

JF - Journal of Economic Psychology

ER -

The evolution of awareness

Abstract

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