The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Indrikis Krams; Hanna Kokko; Jolanta Vrublevska; Mikus Abolins-Abols; Tatjana Krama; Markus J. Rantala

doi:10.1098/rspb.2013.1475

The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Indrikis Krams, Hanna Kokko, Jolanta Vrublevska, Mikus Abolins-Abols, Tatjana Krama, Markus J. Rantala

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	20131475-20131475
Journal	Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences
Volume	280
Issue number	1766
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.1475
Publication status	Published - 2013

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title = "The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game",

abstract = "Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will",

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AU - Abolins-Abols, Mikus

AU - Krama, Tatjana

AU - Rantala, Markus J.

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AB - Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will

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U2 - 10.1098/rspb.2013.1475

DO - 10.1098/rspb.2013.1475

M3 - Article

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VL - 280

SP - 20131475

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JO - Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences

JF - Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences

IS - 1766

ER -

The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

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