The Experience Machine

Ben Bramble

doi:10.1111/phc3.12303

The Experience Machine

Ben Bramble^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	136-145
Number of pages	10
Journal	Philosophy Compass
Volume	11
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12303
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2016
Externally published	Yes

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10.1111/phc3.12303

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abstract = "In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.",

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AB - In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.

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The Experience Machine

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