Abstract
Prime Ministers (PMs) in parliamentary systems shape ministerial succession through hiring and firing their ministerial colleagues.1 This chapter identifies the different ways in which PMs in New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK) punish ministers who perform poorly, examining the similarities and differences that exist both institutionally and in the personality or style of the PMs involved. We explore this issue by thinking about the relationship between PMs and ministers in agency terms. Cabinet government can be thought of as a system whereby the government is accountable to parliament and through parliament to the electorate. In practice that line of accountability works through the party (Brennan and Hamlin, 1993; Strøm, 2000). The PM is supported by her party (or parties in coalition governments) whilst the party gains enough public support.2 The PM’s role is to construct and direct government on behalf of her party, and each minister is directly an agent of the PM and through her indirectly an agent of their party.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | How Power Changes Hands: Transition and Succession in Government |
Editors | Paul 't Hart and John Uhr |
Place of Publication | Basingstoke and New York |
Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan Ltd |
Pages | 157-173 |
Volume | 1 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Print) | 9780230242968 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |