The governance of security in weak and failing states

Benoît Dupont, Peter Grabosky, Clifford Shearing

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This article seeks to identify means of strengthening social control and conflict resolution in weak and failing states. It begins by discussing the governance of public security in stronger states, and identifies three basic forms of engagement between state and nonstate institutions that may contribute to the co-production of public security: coercion, sale and gift. The article then seeks to identify institutional arrangements that might be transplanted to those settings where conventional state institutions of security may be in decline, or non-existent. It also suggests how new institutions might be invented in settings where states may be dysfunctional or otherwise lacking in capacity. It develops a typology of security provision, including auspices that are public; public under private arrangements; collective or voluntary; private/national; private/international; and criminal. By identifying new mechanisms for the governance of security, it may be possible to arrest the deterioration of states, or at least provide for a modicum of internal security. The article concludes with a discussion of the Zwelethemba model of peacemaking and peacebuilding that is being developed in South Africa.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationCrime and Security
    PublisherTaylor and Francis
    Pages481-499
    Number of pages19
    ISBN (Electronic)9781351570732
    ISBN (Print)9780754626008
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'The governance of security in weak and failing states'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this