The Hard Problem of Responsibility

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    Abstract

    According to standard versions of reason-responsiveness agents are fit to be held responsible for a failure to act as reasons require when they had the capacity to act in that way, there were no excuses available to hinder the exercise of that capacity, and still they failed to exercise it. But this analysis suggests that such a failure has to be a fluke that is due to sheer chance or an unknown glitch. And in that case there is no obvious reason to blame the agent for the failure. This chapter seeks to recast the reason-responsiveness approach so that it can deal with this crucial problem.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Volume 3
    EditorsDavid Shoemaker
    Place of PublicationUnited Kingdom
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Pages160-188pp
    Volume4
    Edition1st
    ISBN (Print)9780198744832
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

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