The Indonesian Armed forces, coalitional presidentialism, and democratization: From praetorian guard to imagined balance of power

Marcus Mietzner*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This chapter aims to explain why the Indonesian armed forces continue to yield considerable political power in democratic Indonesia. Using the concept of coalitional presidentialism as its analytical lens, the chapter contends that the extent of the military’s political influence is a reflection of the incumbent president’s threat perception as a far as the risk of impeachment is concerned. Rather ironically, the two presidents elected under the direct popular vote regime, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo, have shown the most anxiety over their possible removal by civilian political allies. As a result, they have viewed the military as an integral part of their presidential coalitions in order to counterbalance against possible civilian defections. In return, they have refrained from challenging the armed forces on further reforms.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationRoutledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia
    PublisherTaylor and Francis
    Pages140-150
    Number of pages11
    ISBN (Electronic)9781315628837
    ISBN (Print)9781138644427
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 3 Jan 2018

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