The meta-problem of consciousness

David J. Chalmers*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    205 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)6-61
    Number of pages56
    JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
    Volume25
    Issue number9-10
    Publication statusPublished - 2018

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