The Moral Equality of Combatants

Christian Barry, Lars Christie

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    Abstract

    The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants on either side of a war have equal moral status even if one side is fighting a just war while the other is not. This chapter examines arguments that have been offered for and against this doctrine, including the collectivist position famously articulated by Walzer and McMahans influential individualist critique. We also explore collectivist positions that have rejected the moral equality doctrine and arguments that some individualists have offered in its favor. We defend a noncategorical version of the moral equality doctrine, according to which combatants on either side of a just war sometimes (but not always) have equal moral status. On our view nonculpable combatants are not liable to attack even when they fight for an unjust cause.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War
    EditorsSeth Lazar and Helen Frowe
    Place of PublicationNew York
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Pages1-22
    Volume1
    Edition1st
    ISBN (Print)9780199943418
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018

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