Abstract
The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants on either side of a war have equal moral status even if one side is fighting a just war while the other is not. This chapter examines arguments that have been offered for and against this doctrine, including the collectivist position famously articulated by Walzer and McMahans influential individualist critique. We also explore collectivist positions that have rejected the moral equality doctrine and arguments that some individualists have offered in its favor. We defend a noncategorical version of the moral equality doctrine, according to which combatants on either side of a just war sometimes (but not always) have equal moral status. On our view nonculpable combatants are not liable to attack even when they fight for an unjust cause.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War |
Editors | Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 1-22 |
Volume | 1 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199943418 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |